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CULTURES AND CUMATES OF LIBERALITY IN
JAPANESE COURT LITERATURE
William E. Naff

The topic of cultures and climates of liberality provides an opportunity to test hypotheses. The first, on which all others must stand or fall,
is that it is possible to speak of a climate and culture of liberality outside
the European tradition. Is the idea of liberality itself so culture-specific
that it can be applied in non-European contexts only by stretching definitions to the point where it is no longer possible to make useful distinctions? Since this discussion could go no further otherwise, it will probably come as no great surprise that I believe it is in fact possible to speak
of a culture and climate of liberality outside of European culture and its
offshoots. It also becomes uppurent that Japanese court culture is going
to be presented as a demonstration that the proposition is true in at least
one case.
Once the major hypothesis is tentatively accepted, others quickly suggest themselves. A particularly interesting one is that a culture and climate of liberality may be a necessary precondition for the appearance of
a great age in the arts. I do not expect to prove this now, but I will
attempt to show that such a climate was present in Japanese court culture and that it is difficult to imagine the literary accomplishments of
that age without this climate. The same may be the case for other periods in other countries, but it is likely that a final proof could only be
achieved by exhaustion. If so, the hypothesis will probably have to
remain a hypothesis. It may still be worthwhile to try to demonstrate its
plausibility in this instance.
The problem becomes more manageable if we can agree that liberality
is by its nuturc u relative phenomenon. There is some slippage in even
the most rigid of social orders and there is no freedom to do anything ul
all under a state of anarchy. We may deal with the question of a culture
and climate of liberality in three ways. First, we may look at the question of liberality from within a given cultural context at a given time,
using the kind of operating definitions and hypotheses already suggested. Second, we may make diachronic comparisons within that cultural tradition, to see if it is possible to make statements about the degree of liberality
operation at one1981
time as against another. Finally, we1
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may make cross-cultural comparisons in order to test their possible significance. Spacc docs not permit either the diachronic or cross-cultural
comparisons here and therefore this will be just a preliminary exercise
at the first and simplest level of this question.
It is neccssary to define terms before this discussion can be taken any
further. What is a culture and climate of liberality? If we attempt to
generate a definition reasonably free from equating liberality with the
plcasunt and attructivc or the merely familiar and reassuring (or with the
liccntious and dissolute), we may come up with something like this: A
culture of liberality is one in which basic assumptions make due allowances of the value and validity of individual cxpcriencc, individual insights, and individual initiatives. The opposite of liberality would be a
condition in which precedent, received opinion, and constituted authority always carry the decisive weight. Liberality thus defined is perhaps
nothing more than the closest approximation of the golden mean that
can actually be achieved in human society. It is that which humanistically-oriented cultures forever seek, seldom find, and usually do not
recognize until it has once again been lost.
A climate of liberality would be one that had a culture of liberality so
defined as its precondition. A culture may have assumptions and values
consonant with liberality present in its official heritage and yet have
them in some periods more or less in eclipse insofar as the actual operation of institutional and social life is concerned. Only when the tradition
and the current mood are congenial to liberality can we speak of a culture and climate of liberality.
Japunese court culture, with which we are to concern ourselves here,
lasted for some six centuries, from the beginning of the seventh to the
end of the twelfth centuries A.D. It had been preceded by the development of a high culture which gradually prevailed over and unified a
hodgepodge of quasi-tribal kingdoms of varying ethnic backgrounds.
This was followed by a long period of military domination that lasted
through the middle of the 19th century. Court culture still existed in an
attenuated form, and it remained the supreme model for elegance and
refinement as well as the ultimate source of legitimacy but it was no
longer at the cutting edge of cultural life. 1
Chinese culture, both that directly received through Japanese contacts
with the mainland and that transmitted through Korea, was the source
and model for Japanese court culture. The eventual dominance of the
Yamato people and the acceptance of their leader as emperor of Japan
was in large part due to the cultural and technological advantages that
accrued as a result of its hospitality to the Chinese and Korean intellec-2
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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tuals and craftsmen who fled to Japan during the long unsettled period
on the continent that followed the collapse of the Han dynasty in China.
Yet this court culture remained a native creation, reflecting native values and world views so strongly that it bccame the creator of most of the
basic monuments of Japanese culture.1
Throughout the period we are considering, the culture of the Japanese
court was narrowly aristocratic. Court circles were claustrophobicnliy
small and restricted. At the height of court culture probably fewer than
50,000 people participated in it in any direct way, even when we include
top-ranking officials in the provincial posts that early camc to be viewed
as virtual sentences of exile. 1 The aristocracy was of course wealthy when
compared with the general populace, but Japan has always been a country
of limited natural resources and its aristocracy lived a life that was rather
austere in material terms when compared with that of most other aristocratic societies ut similar stages of development. Luxury was more a
product of the artisan and the artist than of the bounty of the land. The
glories of the aristocratic milieu were created by the application of technical skill and artistic brilliance to materials that were for the most part
ordinary or even humble. Woodworking, weaving, lacquering, dyeing,
the work of the landscape gardener and of the architect were applied to
the routine products of nature to produce a context of elegance and sophistication. These crafts reflect a highly visual emphasis that remains
one of the salient characteristics of Japanese culture down to the present.
At the highest levels of court society even the personal attendants were
of aristocratic origin. Only workmen, menials, and the servants of the
lower fringes of official life were commoners. When court literature
speaks of the upper, middle, and lower classes, it is always understood
that the various levels of the aristocracy are meant. The rest of the populace quite literally did not count and are dismissed in those very terms in
the literature. Social isolation was nearly absolute and geographical isolation was if anything even more extreme.
Members of the imperial family were almost completely confined to
the buildings of the imperial palace which lay within its own series of
enclosures at the northern edge of the city. Members of the upper aristocracy might have villas in the nearby suburbs, but in the normal
course of events only political or personal misfortune could account for
their being as much as fifty miles from the capital.
The aristocracy lived on the income from tax-free estates which, except for the rare parcel of land near the capital, they would be unlikely
ever to see. Exceptions to this tendency to stay close to home occurred
primarilybyinBYU
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some distant administrative center. The one compensation for being sent
down to the provinces was that it was often possible to amass n fortune
rather quickly there. A family that had lost out at court could rebuild its
financial base by accepting a provincial vice-governorship (the governorships were purely honorary and their holders remained at court).
Upon returning to the capital it could use its wealth to try to re-enter the
upper levels of court society. This particular fragment of the aristocracy
is important to our immediate concerns because one of the most effective first steps in returning to court was to send a gifted daughter to
serve as tutor to the empress. This provincial vice-governor class was
therefore the primary source of the great female intellectuals who created most of the great prose literature of the period. Murasaki Shikibu,
the author of The Tale ofGenji, is the most distinguished member of this
distinguished group.
What we have been describing so far is a rigidly-structured, small,
isolated, and exceedingly exclusive society. At first glancc it might
seem unlikely to provide for the rise of a culture of liberality. But there
was another side to this culture and it is with this side that we are concerned. For all its narrowly aristocratic character, Japanese court culture shared with the rest of Japanese society an overriding emphasis on
the experiential and on concrete reality as defined by everyday life. The
distrust of the abstract, the systematic, and the rigorously logical in
Japanese culture has long been remarked upon. These qualities, quite
unusual in highly literate cultures, made the world view of the Japanese
aristocracy fundamentally different in some ways from those of other
highly-cultured aristocracies.4
One notable difference was that in the absence of systematic rationalization as a mainstay of the woiid view there could be no systematic
rationalization of the position of the aristocracy. Such rationalizations
start from abstract first principles and there was little awareness of or
interest in the question of abstract first principles in Japan. The position
of the aristocracy was seen by all, aristocrat and commoner alike, in a
matter-of-fact and straightforward way. Some people occupy more advantageous positions than others. Since a hierarchical social order in
fact existed, anyone who was not altogether stupid was going to be
conscious of his or her position in that order. In a society little interested
in abstract moral questions there was little concern over whether or not
the social hierarchy did or did not reflect a hierarchy of moral values.
Nor was the aristocracy hostile to commoners; it was merely indifferent
to them. So profound was the social isolation of the aristocracy and so
complete their lack of interest in abstract rationalization of their position

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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that there was no compelling reason to deny the common humanity of
high and low. The Buddhist concept that high rank, wealth, personal
attractiveness, talent, and all such advantages were the rewards for
merit accumulated in previous lives seems at this period actually to have
strengthened the sense of common humanity at the same time that it
underlined social distinctions.
The aristocracy, free from the need to rationalize its position, was
also free to use the leisure and refinement that came with this position to
consider the universal aspects of its experience. In Genji, Murasaki Shikibu is never telling us how a minister or a prince behaves but rather
how a unique human being who happens to be a minister or a prince
responds to unique circumstances. The cyclical perception of lime and
human experience serves as a framework within which it is possible to
make an orderly presentation of human experience and to make comparisons and uchievc insights, but we are also clearly shown that things are
always different each time around.
A sccond way in which this matter-of-fact acceptance of common
humanity functioned was by reducing hostility in confrontations between high and low. Since the aristocracy had never felt called upon to
base its cultural life on a denial of common humanity, the aristocratic
culture never became a general object of commoner hostility. Instead it
became the most important point of reference against which other
classes measured themselves once they acquired the security that enabled them to think beyond mere survival. All of this is not to suggest
that Japan under court, culture was a Utopia free from strife. There was
strife in plenty at the best of times and it increased as the age approached its bloody conclusion in the wars of the last half of the 12th
century. Yet the basic gentleness of the age is underiined in the fact that
no capital punishment was carried out at court for nearly three and a half
centuries in spite of abundant statutory provision for such actions. 1
Kamo no ChOmei gives a convincing picture of the misery and humiliation that followed from being poor and weak in twelfth-century Japan:
When a man of no great standing happens to live next door to a powerful
lord, however happy he may be he cannot celebrate too loudly; however
griefstricken, he cannot raise his voice in lamentations. He is uneasy no matter what he docs; in his every action he trembles like a swallow approaching a
falcon's nest. The poor man who is the neighbor of a wealthy family is always
ashamed of his wretched appearance, and makes his entrances and exits in
bursts of flattery. And when he sees how envious his wife and children and
his servants are, or hears how the rich family despises him, his mind is incessantly torn
by anScholarsArchive,
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It was if anything even less bearable to be poor and powerless then
than now. The social conditions that ChCmei describes seem once again
to lead paradoxically to a decreased spiritual distance between rich and
poor when compared with many other societies. He continues his description of the trials of life:
If u mun'a house stands In a crowded pluce und a fire brcuks out in the
neighborhood, he cannot escape the danger. If it stands in a remote situation,
he must put up with the nuisance of going back and forth to the city, and there
is always a danger of robbers.
Those who are powerftil are filled with greed and those who have no protectors are despised. Possessions bring many worries; in poverty there is sorrow. He who asks another's help becomes his slave; he who nurtures others is
fettered by infection. Ho who complies with the ways of the world nuiy be
impoverished thereby; he who does not appears deranged. Wherever one may
live, whatever one may do, is it possible even for a moment to find a haven
for the body or peace for the mind?'
Without sentimentally glossing over the advantages of the wealthy,
ChOmei nevertheless points out that the difference between rich and
poor is in the end largely a difference in sorrows. The central fact of the
world remains the first Noble Truth of Buddhism: Life is suffering or, in
other words, that things will not go as mankind would have them go.
Even though there was no shortage of misery and humiliation and
catastrophe as the period came to an end, there was subtle but significant difference in the psychological context in which they were experienced in Japan. The question is not one of better or worse. It is simply
one of difference and of trying to understand the implications of that
difference. Catastrophe was not only waiting, it had already struck during ChCmei's lifetime, but it is not with the catastrophes that we arc
concerned here. It is with the age preceding the catastrophe, one of
those rare times in human history when, in spite of Buddhism's first
noble truth, matters did go well enough to leave a memory of greatness
firmly imprinted on the consciousness of succeeding generations.
The implicit acceptance of common humanity under Japanese court
culture could readily become explicit when occasion arose. There is an
uncondescending primitivism in some of the ManyVshU poetry, and
Murasaki Shikibu shows a deep sympathy for the few commoners who
appear in GenjiThis
acceptance was a necessary precondition for the
appearance of the kind of literary culture that grew up in the Japanese
court, but it was not sufficient. It is only with certain aspects of Shinto
und Buddhism, that is to say, of certain Japanese habits of mind when
considering the numinous, that we may begin to approach sufficiency.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
6

Naff: Culture and Climates of Liberality in Japanese Court Literature
33
Shinto is notoriously inchoate and unsystematic and Buddhism had to
shed much of its philosophical rigor and complexity when it left the
monasteries to participate in Japanese life. KatS ShUichi has described
what tended to happen when tightly-organized, sophisticated, and transcendental world views came to Japan:
In some cases the foreign world view was accepted for Itself: In some cases
it was rejected but in the majority of cases the foreign thought system was
adapted (o Japanese needs. This adaptation wa* in standard form when the
thought system was highly organized and sophisticated as in the case of Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Marxism. Abstract, theoretical aspects were weeded out, the transcendental basic principle was excluded, the
comprehensive system dismantled and only that proportion of it retained
which had value in terms of practical application. Whatremainedwas a 'Japunized' world view.*
Thus, when we speak of Buddhism in Japan, we are not referring to a
religious and philosophical system but to an influence traceable in the
nuanccs it introduces into Japanese intuitive processes.
For all the diffuse qualities of Shinto it is possible to discover certain
things within it that outline a world view that is palpably and recognizably Japanese. In this world view there is some speculation about origins and some vague hints of an afterlife, but reality is here and now and
it exists in terms of the experiences of living people. Experience is
defined in terms of esthetic response; it takes place in a world that is
innately good. All the negative aspects of experience; those aspects that
more systematic approaches might separate under such headings as
crime, sin, contact with the dead, wounds, illness, uncleanliness, or
solecism are in Shinto treated as varieties of pollution. All were at least
to some degree manageable through appropriate purification procedures.
The positive aspects of life, those parts of it which are truly "natural," are also treated in esthetic terms. The good, the clean, the beautiful, are discussed in vocabulary that is in large part interchangeable.10 In
this world view there is something like a hierarchy of beauty reflecting
the natural order of a world in which man and nature are not in opposition and in which there is no clear dividing line between man and god.
This hierarchy progresses from the sweet, the pretty and the sentimental, to the ever more simple and austere forms of higher beauty. The
restrained dignity of the shrines at Ise is a familiar example of this
hierarchy of beauty.
At firstby
glance,
Buddhism would1981
seem to be the antithesis of Shinto.7
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The world seems innately negative and horrible. The unsaved are bound
to it in an endless cycle of rebirths. But Buddhism also shares some
common assumptions with Shinto. Perhaps the most significant of these
is that man is in no way separate from nature but is rather a part of it.
Both Shinto and Buddhism are pantheistic, but the pantheism of Buddhism is worked out in elaborate detail while it remains characteristically implicit and unsystematic in Shinto. Buddhism has an elaborately
detailed teleology and soteriology as one would expect from its premises, just as one may readily and correctly deduce from the premises of
Shinto that these fields of thought are of little interest to it.
The dominant impulse in East Asia whenever religious views came
into competition has been for accommodation and reconciliation. On
the doctrinal level this has been a matter of great subtlety and complexity. Dual Shinto in its various manifestations is the most characteristic
product." On the practical level, the working accommodations between
Shinto ind Buddhism seem to have come through an exploration of the
Buddhist insistence upon the illusory nature of all distinctions. This was
completely congenial to the Japanese world view. It displays itself most
notably in the emphasis on the particular in the court poetry that was the
central literary discipline and which assumed the essential identity of
subject and object;" The court poet did not attempt to illustrate univers a l or to demonstrate doctrinal points. He attempted instead to capture
the emotional tone of the moment and to isolate the smallest unit of a
reality in which his internal state and the outside world were one.
Ame sosogu
Hanatachibana ni
Kaze sugite
Yama-hototogisu
Kumo ni nakunari

Rain-drenched
Orange blossoms
Stir in the wind;
Mountain hoioiogisu
Sing in the clouds.
Fujiwara Shunzei (1114-1204)"

This is the kind of moment that most of us will usually miss altogether. If we should notice it, it would be as a fleeting sensation that we
are neither able to describe to others nor even to supply with enough
verbal markers to retain it in our own memories. Shunzei has brought
this fragile moment to us intact over eight centuries and half a world
away because he was a great poet working in a tradition in which all
experience was significant, l b grasp that significance requires strength
and discipline of a high order. Triviality exists only in eye of the inadehttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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plctely from his own poem while presenting his experience fresh and
untainted. The first requirement for this land of poetry is a complete
openness to experience that docs not choose between the joyous and the
painful, but accepts all equally. This openness reflects a courage that is
every bit as impressive and is in fact of the same order as that of the
warrior on the battlefield. In displaying these qualities, Shunzei demonstrates that he participates fully in the court culture which valued them
so highly. Yet these qualities are not quite so central to our immediate
concerns as is the discipline by which Shunzei is able to so vastly improve the signal to noise ratio of ordinary human perceptions. Signals
given by breezes and orange blossoms are too subtle for most of us to
deal will). Shun/.ei's touch is so sure not only bccuusc he was u gifted
poet but bccausc he was working in a tradition that hud been refining
these techniques for more than five hundred years. These techniques
served above all to heighten and to preserve individual experience and
they sprang from an assumption that individual experience was, if perceived with full authenticity und integrity, in no wuy different from
ultimate reality. In focussing upon the particular rather than upon the
general, il cncourugcd a liberalized perception of human beings.
The reconciliation of Buddhist despair about this world and the Shinto
celebration of it comes through this treatment of the particular. Since
small, ephemeral happenings were simply aspects of the ultimate reality, they were not distinct from it. If one fully and truly grasped any
part, one grasped the whole. The understanding that resulted, the
"enlightenment" that Buddhism speaks of seems in part to be an understanding that all distinctions are illusory. NagBijuna taught that
"nirvana is samsara, samsara is nirvana."14 Samsara, the world of
conditioned experience and of suffering, and its opposite, nirvana, the
world of extinction, are in the end identical. Even this distinction is
illusory. The philosophical presentation of this proposition is among the
most difficult in all of Buddhist teachings, but after undergoing in Japan
the kind of adaptation through simplification that KatO describes, it
seems to have informed Japanese thought in such a way that the Shinto
and Buddhist world views also appeared to be essentially identical. The
source of suffering in everyday life lay not in the evil nature of the
world but in the misapprehensions that people held about the nature of
the world. Such misapprehensions could be viewed as "impurities" or
"pollutions" and Buddhist metaphysics could be recast in terms of
Shinto csthclicism. The world wus benign after all, but the problem of
purification was both a more difficult and a more urgent one than it had
first seemed to be in early Shinto.
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In Shinto, a pursuit of beauty through a hierarchical order of ever
more austere forms could in itself take on the character of an ascetic
discipline. Such a discipline could be carried out in terms of a pursuit of
excellence In any particular area of skill since all arc aspects of the great
unity. Thus the readiness in Japan to refer to any skilled calling as a
"way" or quasi-religious discipline and the tendency for the roles of
artist and priest to shade into one another are accounted for. In the end
we come to something that seems like Buddhist salvation but which is
realized through Shinto means as one is freed from the suffering of this
world through a disciplined purging of inadequate perceptions. The end
product of this reconciliation of the Shinto and Buddhist world views is
what might be culled a kind of informal doctrine of "salvation through
beauty." The question of salvation through beauty is one that underlies
Japanese artistic endeavour from Murasaki to BashS and, through ironic
inversion, the works of such twentieth-century writers as Nagai KafQ
and Tanizaki iun'ichirO."
The preoccupution with the particular, with its predisposition to focus
on the individual, and the idea of salvation through beauty, with its
inclination toward the positive, both predisposed Jupuncsc court culture
toward liberality. The appearance in the Heian period of the Shingon
and Tendai Buddhist sects with their message of salvation for all
(shikkai jcbutsu) was perhaps the final factor that brought this tendency
into maturity." The assumption that no one had any advantage in the
quest for salvation because of worldly position now received further
reenforcement. The absence of triviality was more clearly apparent; neither incidents nor people could be dismissed out of hand as being of no
consequence. Individuals were important in their own right and the way
in which they dealt with their own lives was of high significance. The
important things were after all in this world just as Shinto had maintained, and the focus on this world brought us back once again to the
individuals in it. These ideas and assumptions were operating in a social
and political context of considerable complexity but they determined
the ruling preoccupations and in particular that preoccupation with esthetic matters that Sir George Sansom has so aptly termed "The Rule of
Taste.""
Under this "rule of taste," the literature of the Japanese court developed its characteristic stance, informed by the Shinto-Buddhist synthesis. The starting point of this court literature is court poetry. In the
Japanese preface to the first imperial anthology, the Kokinsha, published in 905 A:D., Ki no Tsurayuki first attempted a definition of Japahttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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Japanese verse, taking the heart of mankind at its seed, burgeons forth into
the myriad leaves of speech. In the midst of the complications and distractions
of this world, people will express what Is in their hearts about what they see
and what they hear. The waibler among the cherry blossoms, the frogs that
live in the waters; can anything live without singing its song? Without exerting force, Japanese verse moves heaven and earth, it causes the unseen gods
and demons to take pity, it makes gende therelationshipsbetween men and
women, and it comforts the heart of the bold warrior, such is its nature."
The function of poetry is expressive rather than didactic and it is this
expressivist stance that made most accessible the major concerns of the
society. The preeminence of poetry among human activities was due to
this expressivist doctrine. The feelings of the individual are important
for what they tell others about the social nuances that largely determine
lives lived in very close physical proximity. The conventions of court
poetry enabled the individual to keep check on his emotions and provided him with a discipline that aids in monitoring them for authenticity. At the same time they provide a socially acceptable outlet for his
feelings and assure him that if his verse is both correct and graceful, its
emotional content will probably be validated by the acceptance of his
peers. This practical social function is not contradictory to the conception of poetry as a quest for reality and tnith but, within a world view
that is above all pragmatic, reaffirms it.
The world view of Japanese court literature is determined by considerations of authenticity within the conventions observed by the group.
Form, content, speaker, poet, and subject are all one, so that a lapse in
poetic technique must necessarily reflect a defect in character. The only
sin in poetic creation was inauthenticity. Sound diction and form were
the hallmarks of authenticity, which was the paramount value. An incident in the career of Ariwara no Narihira (825-880) illustrates the way
in which authenticity took precedence over all other values. Biographical material about 9th-century poets is extremely meager but according
to the he Monogalari version of the story and the prose settings given
from the Kokinshu for the poems about the incident it is really irrelevant
whether or not the affair really took place at all. Whatever the facts of
the matter, this is the version that appeared in two works that were part
of the basic education of every educated person in Japan for the'next
thousand years. Narihira is said to have had a rendezvous with an imperial princess who was in service at the Ise shrines. This was a post that
carried with it the strictest requirements for abstention and purification.
The next morning after their meeting, the princess sent a poem to Narihira and by
he BYU
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Kimi ya koshi
Ware ya yukiken
Omoezn
Yume ka utsutsu ka
Nctc ka samete ka

Did you come to nie?
Or did I go to you?
I can't tell.
Was it a dream? Was it real?
Was I asleep? Was I awake?

Kakikurasu
Kokoro no yami ni
Madoi ni ki
Yume utsutsu to wa
Yo hito sadame yo

Through the blackpst
Night of the heart
I wandered, lost, '.
Whether in dreajn or reality
Let the world decide."

What is purportedly happening here is the breaking of u mujor religious taboo as described in two of the most important texts of the culture. Yet what follows is not the scandal, disgrace, and severe punishment that experience with other cultures might lead us to expect to find
described in'texts that were above all texts for teaching courtly deportment. We are instead invited to appreciate the aftertaste of the turbulent
emotions that led to the incident.
At another time, Narihira did get into trouble. He did so not by breaking a religious taboo but, far more serious in court society, a social one.
He bccamc involved with a lady, one in the service of the empress, and
therefore not supposed to be accessible to him. Yet even this break with
convention had far less serious results than it might have had in other
courts or even at other times in Japan; the lady was simply sent away.
We remember the incident today because it was the occasion of Narihira's most famous poem. The poet visits a room where he and his love
had been together just a year earlier:
Tsuki ya aranu
Haru ya mukashi no
Haru naranu
Waga mi hitotsu wa
Moto no mi ni shite

Is this the moon?
Is this spring the same
Spring as that one?
Only I myself remain
The same as I was then.10

Both poet and reader are entirely uninterested in the question of
whether or not it was "proper" to have engaged in an affair with a
prohibited woman. That was a question to be dealt with on the administrative level; it was no concern of poetry. What was important to poetry
was the precise emotional tone of this experience. Questions of rank or
position, or of religious or moral strictures as expounded in the Buddhist
scriptures or Confucian classics were very important but they did not
occupy the supreme position In the poet's hicrurchy of vuluci. (And
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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everyone at court had to be to some degree a poet.) The first level of
interest is in the emotions of the individual. The proposition is not argued from first principles. No philosophers created systems to demonstrate its truth. The feelings of the individual were simply assumed by
the culture to be the locus of supreme value and authenticity consisted in
conducting oneself in accord with this truth. Life was an art not a science, and it could not be reduced to formula. Because there was no
metaphysical structure underlying this focus on the emotions, the most
rigorous discipline had to be followed if authenticity was to be maintained and the poetry was not to become a corrupt mire of empty posturing and infuntilc self-dramatization. No one would ever have thought to
defend slackness as a matter of "artistic temperament"; in this respect
at least, the people of the Japanese court would have been baffled by
our century.
Intensity and directness of expression were the most important marks
of authenticity, and in the conventions of the poetry as in the world at
large, it was love that provided the best opportunities for such tightlyfocussed emotional experiences. Love poetry was highly prized and the
issue was never whether or not the love was proper or sanctioned but
whether it was authentic. The tone could be wry and playful:
Koishiku wa
Kite mo miyo kashi
Chihayabura
Kami no isamum
Michi nara naku ni

If you long for me
Why not just come and see me?
The all-powerful
Gods have surely not
.$
Denied the way to you.11
?'

Whatever excuses a laggard lover might have he certainly could not
plead the prohibitions of the gods as an excuse. It is interesting that the
speaker of this poem is not, as European reflexes might lead us to assume, a woman but a man. Narihira was getting involved with the princess at the Ise shrine. It was, according to the traditional account, she
who had first expressed interest, and it was Narihira who was suggesting rather impatiently, almost sarcastically, that she really should be
more aggressive; it could hardly be the gods who were restraining her.
For the gods loo, authenticity was the highest value, far more urgent a
need than formalistic adherence to social and religious restrictions.
Paradox was not a serious problem for the people of this culture.
Whitman's " D o I contradict myself?/ Very well then I contradict thyself," would have seemed completely gratuitous to them, and they
would certainly have seen no need for Whitman's explanatory parenthesis. Nor would they have shared the horror of Mitya when he observed
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that "Beauty is a terrible and awful thing! It is terrible because it has not
been fathomed and can never be fathomed, for God sets us nothing but
riddles." In Narihira's world, this was the glory of existence not its
bane."'
In practice there seemed to be little concern at this particular period in
Japanese history with following any rules except the rules of taste in all
areas of art and life. All meliorative impulses were directed toward
refinement of the standards of taste. These standards were to be judged
not systematically and rationally but subjectively in terms of their ability to provide a surer guide to the subtly elusive goal of authenticity.
The prodigious snarl of philosophical loose ends that this approach left
was not of importance to people who were not philosophers, but lovers
of life, the world and, ideally, of each other. The problems it left in the
larger political world were never resolved.
It was out of this context that the culture and climate of liberality at
the Heian court was created. These were the qualities that made that
culture in some ways spiritually akin to our own age of relativism, or at
least to those portions of it that partake of anything that might be called
a culture and climate of liberality. It is for these reasons that a Japanese
critic could observe that Kawabata Yasunari was awarded the Nobel
Prize for Literature in 1968 in part because he seemed in some ways an
advanced writer by Western standards in precisely those areas of his art
that referred most directly to the standards and conventions of Japanese
court literature. These were the same qualities in Kawabata's writing
that made him seem old-fashioned and embarrassing to some Japanese
readers.
These aspects of Japanese court life did not altogether eliminate the
normal stresses and strains imposed by politics and economics. Life at
the Japanese court was remarkably free from violence and deadly intrigue. Although the values we have been discussing surely played a
role in Uic humane quality of court life, the very limited real power of
the court during much of the time under consideration also helped to
reduce aristocratic competition to levels at which civilized standards
were more easily maintained. They played a direct role in political careers, particularly at the middle level. A mastery of poetry, calligraphy,
and the polite accomplishments and graces reflected a complete interiorizulion of the stundards of the society. They could often be cruciul in
gaining recognition and advancement. Insistence on authenticity as defined by court culture standards seems also to have a bearing on the
adaptability that has marked Japanese history as well as on certain
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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tions of institutional survival tend to take precedence over Abstract considerations of doctrinal purity.
If the culture and climate of liberality that prevailed throughout much
of Japanese court culture was due in large part to its mistrust of logical
rigor and its emphasis on a standard of authenticity that inevitably focussed on the individual, this quality could produce many other interesting effects. Some of these lead us direcdy back to our main theme.
The pragmatic, this-worldly bias of the culture did not exclude an
awareness of the elusive quality of reality. We have already seen the
difficulty in distinguishing between dream and reality in the exchange
of poems between Narihira and the princess. Another poem by Shunzei
shows what can be done with this approach when used for its own potential. The poem is built around an allusion to the last chapter of The
Tale of Genji, which ends inconclusively and which is entitled 'The
Floating Bridge of Dreams':
Ham no yo no
Yume no ukihashi
Tbdaeshete
Mine nl wakamru
Yokogumo no sora

The spring night's
Floating bridge of dreams
Breaks off;
Drifting away from the peaks,
The cloud bands of the sky."

The dream world of the first three lines is opposed to the "real"
world of the last two, but the "floating bridge of dreams", of the first
part of the poem, insubstantial as it feels, is far more concrete than the
transverse cloud that echoes it in the second part. The word "Sora" here
translated as "sky" can also mean "the void," "sunyata" in Buddhist
terms. The certainties lliut resonate In the formal perfection und elegunt
diction of the poem dissolve into a mass of ambiguities and uncertainties. Mitya's cry of despair becomes a posture of rapture and wonder
before the same mystery.
These same assumptions that inform Japanese court literature also
made possible the surrealistic word pictures of a Teika or, some centuries later, the abstractions of a SesshU. Teika was Shunzei's son and the
last great figure of the great age of court poetry. By the time he reached
adulthood he was already living in the next age, an age of military
horror that he ignored as far as was humanly possible. Here is a poem he
produced on the assigned theme of "The Imperial Banquet of 0 e New
Year":
Hani kureba
Hoshi no kurai ni
Kage mlete

Kumoi no hashi nl
Izuni taoyame
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Spring now come*
Along the edge of the cloud world
Emerge the lovely, graceful maidens."
And among the ranks of sure
Light blazes forth.
t
It was not until the 20th ccntury thut Jupuncse poets uguin upprouchcd
language in just this way, but they were by then writing a very different
poetry. This vision of the court as a realm of stars in the form of courtiers whose brilliance illuminates the beauty of the court ladies as they
make their appearance "at the edge of the cloud world," the conventional term for the court, created with a surety of form and diction that
preserves it from excess, reminds us once again of the splendor of this
court. It is useful to reflect upon what it tells us of its refinement and
elegance of sentiment. Among its many facets are those that suggest
that the rational faculties are not the only ones that respond to rigor and
discipline nor are they always certain to be the most effective way to
honor man, his world, and its wonder.
University of
Amherst

Massachusetts,

NOTES
1. There are several general histories of Japan that give a sense of this development. The first dozen chapters of Sir George Sansom, History of Japan to
1334 (Stanford, 1938) provides the best general coverage.
2. This period produced, among other things, the great anthology of early
Japanese poetry, the ManyOshU; the first eight imperial anthologies of poetry,
un extensive range of diaries, personal miscellanies, tales, and novels, and the
beginnings of a substantial critical literature.
3. Sunsom, op. cit., p. 474,
4. Nakumura Hajime, Philip Wiener, ed., The Ways of Thinking of Eastern
Peoples (revised edition, Honolulu, 1964), gives a superb coverage of this
problem. The Japanese literature is voluminous. Perhaps the most useful demonstrations of these tendencies in action are in such historical works written in
the court period as the Eiga Monogatari and the GukanshO.
5. Sansom, op. cit., p. 256.
6. Translation by Donald Keene in Donald Keene, ed., Anthology of Japanese Literature (New York, 1955), pp. 204-205.
7. Keene, op. cit., p. 205.
8. For a discussion of primitivism in Japanese court poetry, see Robert
Brower and Earl Miner, Japanese Court Poetry (Stanford, 1961), pp. 21-23.
Here, as with all the other poems discussed in this paper I am indebted to
Brower and Miner. Wherever I have disagreed with them in translation or interpretation it has been with trepidation and in full awareness that their work is an
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol7/iss7/3
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absolutely Indispensable supplement to the Japanese commentaries on the subject.
9. ShUichi KatO, David Chibbet, tr., A History of Japanese Literature: The
First Thousand Years (Tokyo, 1979). p. 21.
10. See Alicia Orioff Matsunaga, "The Land of Natural Affirmation: PreBuddhist Japan", Monumenta Nipponica 21:1/2 (1967), pp. 203-209. Earl
Miner discusses the matter in his Introduction to Japanese Court Poetry (Stanford, 1968). See particularly pp. 9 and 11.
11. Alicia Orioff Matsunaga, The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation (Tokyo, 1969) takes up this question from the Buddhist point of view. It is an
excellent demonstration of the point that KatO makes.
12. Matsunaga, op. cit., pp. 68-69, gives a synopsis of NagTErjuna's argument on this point. Like the later coming of Zen Buddhism, this view seems to
have been so well-received in Japan because it served to icenforce preexisting
assumptions.
13. The poem is number 202, vol. Ill, Kokinshu. For an alternative translation and discussion, see Brower and Miner, op. cit., pp. 305 and 464.
14. Matsunaga, op. cit., p. 68.
15. The concept of "salvation through beauty," although never clearly articulated in the literature so far as I know, seems to be one of the great underlying
concerns of Japanese literature. It can be traced through works of every major
genre and author but it is taken up most clearly in the works of Murasaki Shikibu and Matsuo BashO. I have discussed Murasaki's treatment of the theme in
Comparative Civilizations Review, No. 1 (Winter, 1979), pp. 52-53, but the
main source Is, of course, the Crr\JI itself. For BashO, Ueda Makoto, Matsuo
BashiB (New York, 1970) is a splendid introduction to these and other aspects of
the career of a man who has few enemies but has often suffered terribly at the
hands of his friends. The chapter on "Get\jl as a Modern Novel" In Thomas
Rimer, Modern Japanese Fiction and its Antecedents (Princeton, 1978) is to be
recommended.
16. Sansom, op. cit., pp. 117-123, surveys the coming of these two schools.
Yoshito S. Hakcda Kukai: Major Works is an important introduction to its subject, the most important religious figure of his period. "Essentials of KDkai's
Esoteric Buddhist Thought", pp. 76-100, is a model of the way in which Buddhism was adapted to Japanese needs and preoccupations.
17. Sansom, op. cif., Chapter IX.
18. My translation is of the text of Saeki Umetomo, ed., Kokinwakashu (Tokyo 1958; Volume VIII of Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei (NKBT)), p. 93.
19. In the KokinshV these poems are numbers 645 and 646. They are to be
found in their more extensive prose settings in episode 69 of the Ise Monogat&ri
(,NKBT IX).
20. Kokinshu. 747.
21. Ise Monogatari, episode 71.
22. Constance Garnett, tr., The Brothers Karamazov (New York: Modern
Library), p. 128. In Gadel, Escher, Bach (New York, 1979), Douglas R. Hof-
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studicr notes the horror and loathing that paradox and "the strange loop" have
aroused in traditional Western thought. It had seemed self-evident to most theorists that both resulted from faulty premises or inadequate technique. In practice, Uulh joyously accepted them, Eschcr made a career of them and GOdcl
seems to have proved that any system that attempted to eliminate them would
necessarily and inevitably be self-contradictory. This destruction of one of the
last refuges of certainty in Western thought hus been yet unplhcr shock to a set
of world views that looked to certitude as a reasonable goal. It is not at all
disturbing to the Buddhist and East Asian world views nor, as Hofstadter demonstrates, to many Western audiences. His approach appears to be a useful one
for (hose interested in making a more systematic translation of Japanese esthetics into more responsible and useful Western language terms than have usually
been the cusc up to now.
23. Shinkokinsha 38; Brower and Miner, op. cit., p. 262.
24. Shui CusS 389; original as cited in Brower and Miner, op. cit., p. 264.
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